CRITICISM OF SCIENTISM AND LIMITS REFLECTIONS: HABERMAS AND HEIDEGER

Abstract

The paper analyzes Habermas's thesis on the denial of reflection in the context of the critique of contemporary scientism and metaphysics, bringing it into dialogue with Heidegger's philosophical project. Starting from the tradition of the Frankfurt School, it is shown that both philosophy and science share common positivist assumptions, which are reflected in the uncritical acceptance of objectivity and instrumental rationality. Habermas's call for the renewal of reflection is interpreted as an attempt to overcome these limitations through critical and emancipatory thinking. However, the paper suggests that within Heidegger's approach to the problem of positivism, positions can be found that indicate a more radical approach to the aforementioned problem, by questioning reflection, thinking and philosophy as such. Taking into account Heidegger's concept of the forgetting of Being, it seems that the call for the renewal of reflection is already within the positivist horizon that it nominally tries to overcome. In the paper, we will consider the question of whether within Heidegger's philosophical starting points one can really find positions that are more fundamental than the previously mentioned demands for radical philosophical self-criticism of the basic principles of thought that we find among the representatives of the Frankfurt School.